Beckstead v. Marsing : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Beckstead v. Marsing : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
LaVar E. Stark, George B. Handy; attorney for defendants.
Robert E. Froerer; attorney for appellants.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Beckstead v. Marsing, No. 860093.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1540
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAY M. BECKSTEAD, JEANNE 
BERTRAND AND JEANNE 
FONTAINE, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
ROBERT W. MARSING, GAY 
MARSING, DONALD RAY DENNIS, 
FRANCIS H. DENNIS, JEFFERY 
W. McBRIDE and BARBARA H. 
McBRIDE, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS MARSING 
LAVAR E. STARK, ESQUIRE 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Respondents Marsing 
GEORGE B. HANDY, ESQUIRE 
2650 Washington Blvd. Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Respondents McBride 
ROBERT H. FROERER, ESQUIRE 
536 - 24th Street, Suite 2B 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UT^H 
K J 
.A.-, 
D O C K E T HO. >-~ • •
 f KtcCX^ 
8b0093-C& 
Case No. 20411 
FILED 
APR2 41985 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAY M. BECKSTEAD, JEANNE : 
BERTRAND AND JEANNE 
FONTAINE, : 
P l a i n t i f f s / A p p e l l a n t s , : 
v . : C a s e No. 2 0 4 1 1 
ROBERT W. MARSING, GAY : 
MARSING, DONALD RAY DENNIS, 
FRANCIS H. DENNIS, JEFFERY : 
W. McBRIDE and BARBARA H. 
McBRIDE, : 
Defendants/Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS MARSING 
LAVAR E. STARK, ESQUIRE 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Respondents Marsing 
GEORGE B. HANDY, ESQUIRE 
2650 Washington Blvd. Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Respondents McBride 
ROBERT H. FROERER, ESQUIRE 
536 - 24th Street, Suite 2B 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATUTES AND RULES iii 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 4 
CONCLUSION 10 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 11 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Bench v. Pace, 538 P2d 180 7 
Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 513 P2d 417 . . . . 6 
Davidson v. Salt Lake City, 81 P2d 374 10 
Doxey - Layton Company v. Stark, 548 P2d 902. . 6 
Hurwitz v. David B. Richards and Company, 
436 P2d 794 6 
Jensen v. Manila Corporation of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 
565 P2d 63 9 
Ross v. Olson, et al. , 481 P2d 675 5 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Annotated (195 3) as amended 
Section 78-12-26(3) . . iii 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 (c) • . . . . . iii 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTE AND RULE 
Section 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended: 
Within three years. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake; but the cause of 
action in such case shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of 
the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon, The 
Motion shall be served at least ten 
days before the tine fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party, prior to 
the day of the hearing, may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
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GAY M. BECKSTEAD, JEANNE 
BERTRAND and JEANNE 
FONTAINE, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. MARSING, GAY 
MARSING, DONALD RAY DENNIS, 
FRANCIS H. DENNIS, JEFFERY 
W. McBRIDE and BARBARA H. 
McBRIDE, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 20411 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
WHETHER THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY 
MATERIAL FACT AND WHETHER DEFENDANTS ARE 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Complaint filed in the District Court of 
Weber County, State of Utah, prays for reformation of 
the description in a deed and for cancelling of record 
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subsequent deeds. (R 5) Trial Judge, Ronald 0. Hyde 
granted Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment ruling 
that the action was based on misrepresentation and 
mistake and was barred by the three (3) year statute of 
limitations. (R 164, 165) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondents Marsing were the owners of a parcel 
of real property in Weber County, State of Utah, consisting 
of twelve (12) acres. (The references to the acreage 
herein are approximate) (R 136, 143) A nine (9) acre 
portion was sold to Appellant Beckstead under a Contract 
of Sale. The remainder was sold to Respondents Dennis 
who received title in two (2) segments. (R 60, 145) First 
to two (2) acres and then to the one (1) acre contiguous 
to the parcel sold to Beckstead. (R 139) Prior to 
Respondents Dennis receiving title to the one (1) acre, 
Appellant Beckstead sold her nine (9) acres plus the 
one (1) acre to Appellants Bertrand and Fontaine under 
a Contract of Sale. (R 144) Bertrand and Fontaine caused 
to be recorded a Notice of Contract Interest describing 
ten (10) acres (R 139, 145, 146) prior to Respondents 
Dennis recording the conveyance of the one (1) acre. 
Respondents Dennis subsequently conveyed their interest 
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in the three (3) acres to Respondents McBride. (R 2) 
This action was commenced in August of 1982• 
The two "count" Complaint alleges first that in October 
of 1977 Respondents Marsing, in negotiating to sell real 
property to Appellant Beckstead, represented that there 
were ten (10) acres involved; that "because of an error 
in the description" the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
signed by these parties covered only nine (9) acres 
and did not cover the property intended to be conveyed; 
that during the spring of 1979, Appellants discovered 
the error in the Contract and Deed. (R 3) 
Appellants were aware, by April of 19 79, of the 
claimed error in the description in the Beckstead 
Contract. (R 57) However, this action was not commenced 
until after the expiration of three (3) years from such 
knowledge. Appellants paid the balance due under the 
contract and received and recorded the deed in October 
of 1983. (R 146) 
Appellants, in the second count of their 
Complaint, seek to set aside the deeds conveying the one 
(1) acre to Respondents Dennis and to Respondents McBride 
on the grounds that a prior Notice of Contract Interest 
has been recorded. 
-3-
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Respondents filed Motions for Summary Judgment 
requesting the dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds 
that Appellants1 action for reformation of the descriptions 
was barred by the three (3) year statute of limitations. 
Judge Hyde granted the Motions. 
SUMMARY OF APGUMENT 
The action of Appellants to reform the des-
cription is barred by the three (3) year statute of 
limitations. The argument of the Appellants that the 
statute of limitations does not commence to run until 
delivery of the deed is not valid in view of the actual 
notice of the error prior thereto. The argument of 
Appellants that the conveyances to Respondents Dennis 
and McBride should be set aside is premature. Appellants 
must first establish that they have superior right to the 
one (1) acre. Appellants1 claim that they were in con-
tinuous possession of the disputed property is not 
supported by the record. Appellants1 claim that they 
have not alleged mistake simply is not the case. 
ARGUMENT 
The issue in this case is whether there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and whether 
-4-
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Respondents are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
For purposes of Respondents Marsing's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, they are willing to acknowledge 
the allegations of Appellants1 Complaint that: 
1. Respondents Marsing represented that 
the parcel consisted of ten (10) acres. 
2. Due to error, a nine (9) acre parcel 
was described in the contracts and 
deed. 
3. The error was discovered by Appellants 
by the spring of 1979. (April) 
4. This action was commenced in August 
of 1982. 
Section 78-12-26(3), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, provides that an action for relief on the 
grounds of mistake must be brought within three (3) 
years after discovery of the mistake by the aggrieved 
party. 
The case of Ross v. Olson, et al., 481 P2d 675 
has application here wherein the Court said: 
"The Plaintiff is further foreclosed here 
by the limitation statute. It is obvious 
that he knew of the matter about which he 
complains here, more than three years prior 
to his suit, he having refused to make 
further payments on his contract more than 
three years prior thereto, — which stemmed 
from his own investigation into the Futura 
contract, whence he was advised by Mrs. 
Glenn, party thereto, that she was not 
about to convey the lot in question to 
Futura or Ross". 
-5-
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Point One of Appellants1 Argument in their 
Brief claims that the statute of limitations does not 
commence to run until delivery of the deed from escrow. 
The cases relied on for this position do not apply to 
the fact situation here. 
Hurwitz v. David B. Richards and Company, 436 
P2d 794, had to do with an action for breach of contract. 
In this case, the action is for reformation of a 
description based on mistake. 
Appellants cite Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 
513 P2d 417 where Buyer claimed Sellers breached the 
contract for the sale of land by entering into an 
agreement to sell part of that land to another party. 
This case is distinguishable from the instant case 
inasmuch as the land Respondents Marsing agreed to sell 
to Appellant Beckstead in the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
is the land that was sold and conveyed. 
Doxey - Layton Company v. Stark, 548 P2d 902 
is likewise distinguishable. 
The Court held, in effect, that there was no 
actual notice of the error in the deed regarding the 
conveyance of mineral rights at the time it was signed; 
that there was no constructive notice of such error at 
the time the deed was placed in escrow but there was 
-6-
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notice at the time of delivery of the deed. 
In our case there was actual notice of the 
claimed error more than three (3) years prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
Appellants1 Point Two has to do with Respondents 
Dennis having prior knowledge of Appellants1 Bertrand 
and Fontaine's claim to an interest in the one (1) acre 
before recording the deed. Appellants1 Complaint seeks 
to have this deed set aside. 
Appellants1 rely on the case of Bench v. Pace, 
538 P2d 180. That case has no application here. That 
case had to do with a claim of an optionor against an 
optionee to reform an agreement to convey real property 
by reserving in the optionor mineral rights. Optionee 
claimed that the statute of limitations, Section 78-12-25 
and Section 78-12-26(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
barred Defendant's (Optionor's) right to seek reformation 
of the lease agreement and that she was guilty of laches 
in claiming the right to reform. The Court held: 
"The Defendant had leased the mineral 
estate to third parties, which fact was 
well known to the Plaintiffs and the 
leasing arrangement was ratified by 
Plaintiffs. The Defendant's ownership 
of the mineral estate was not threatened 
until these proceedings were initiated, 
and in view of that circumstance, we 
are of the opinion that the statute of 
-7-
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limitations and the doctrine of laches 
do not apply." 
In the instant case Appellant Beckstead is 
a stranger to the title. Appellants are not entitled 
to have the conveyance to Dennis (and to McBrides) set 
aside on the strength of the recording of a Notice of 
Contract Interest. 
Respondents Marsing were the record owners of 
the twelve (12) acres at the time of the contract of 
sale of nine (9) acres to Appellant Beckstead. 
Respondents Marsing were the record owners of the one (1) 
acre at the time Appellant Beckstead sold, under 
contract, the nine (9) acres and the one (1) acre to 
Appellants Bertrand and Fontaine. Respondents Marsing 
were the record owners of the one (1) acre at the time 
Appellants Bertrand and Fontaine recorded a Notice of 
Contract Interest as to their parcel. Respondents 
Marsing were the record owners of the one (1) acre at 
the time they conveyed it to Respondents Dennis. 
Respondents Dennis were the owners of the one (1) acre 
at the time they conveyed it to Respondents McBridec 
To be in a position to seek a decree setting 
aside the Dennis conveyance, Appellants must first be 
successful in reforming the Marsing to Beckstead contract 
-8-
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and deed. 
Appellants1 Point Three claims that an issue 
as to whether the statute of limitations for fraud and 
mistake is tolled where a party against whom the statute 
runs is in possession or constructive possession of the 
premises. 
Arguing that the statute of limitations for 
fraud and mistake do not apply where the one against 
whom the statute is to be asserted is in possession, 
Appellants rely on the case of Jensen v. Manila Cor-
poration of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 565 P2d 6 3. That case had to do with the 
assertion of the defense of laches. In that case the 
Plaintiff was in continuous possession of the disputed 
property. This is not so in our case. There is no 
evidence that Appellants occupied or possessed the one 
(1) acre parcel. The Jensen case had to do with laches 
not the statute of limitations. The Jensen case has no 
application here. 
In Point Four Appellants assert that for the 
statute of limitations for fraud and mistake to apply, 
there must be an allegation of fraud or mistake. We 
agree. The Complaint of Appellants alleges that 
Respondents Marsing represented there were ten acres — 
-9-
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the description included only nine (9) acres instead of 
ten (10) acres — there was an error in the description. 
There was mistake (error) alleged. The three 
(3) year statute applies. 
The case of Davidson v. Salt Lake City, 81 P2d 
374 cited by Appellants held that the three (3) year 
statute of limitations applied on either the basis of 
fraud or mistake. Quoting from the opinion: 
"This Court has also held that although 
actions by which nothing is sought except 
to remove a cloud from or to quiet the 
title to real property as against apparent 
or stale claims are not barred by the 
statute of limitations yet the statute 
does not apply to actions in which the 
principal purpose is to obtain some 
affirmative relief". 
In the Davidson case, the Plaintiff asked that 
a Decree be cancelled for fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
There being no genuine issue as to any material 
fact, Respondents are entitled to judgment of dismissal 
of Appellants1 Complaint as a matter of law. The judgment 
of the trial Court should be affirmed. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 2 4th day of April, 1985. 
<-**' A i . 
/ -* 
LaVar E. Stark r-~" ~~ 
Attorney for Respondents Marsing 
2 4 85 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84 401 
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GEORGE B. HANDY 
Attorney for Respondents McBride 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102 
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ROBERT H. FROERER 
Attorney for Appellants 
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/ 
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/ 
LaVar E. Stark 
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